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Abstract
Standard techniques for incorporating liquidity costs into the fair value
of derivatives produce counter-intuitive results when credit risk of the coun-
terparty (CVA) and of the investor (DVA) are added to the picture. Here,
Massimo Morini and Andrea Prampolini show that a consistent framework
can only be achieved by giving an explicit representation to the funding
strategy, including associated default risks.
1 Introduction
The pricing of funding liquidity and the pricing of counterparty credit risk are
closely related. Companies usually compute a spread for funding costs that
includes a compensation for their own risk of default. However, interactions
between the two are still poorly understood, while banks are in need of a sound
framework to underpin consistent policies for charging funding and credit costs.
In this work we try and provide some cornerstones of a unified consistent frame-
work for liquidity and credit risk adjustments that can help banks in this process.
We first argue that a naive application of the standard approach to including
funding costs by modifying the discounting rate, when it is put in place together
with the standard approach for the computation of CVA (credit value adjust-
ment) and DVA (debt value adjustment) leads to double-counting of assets that
can be realized only once. Here we show how this issue can be avoided. We
devise a practical and general approach to the problem, by taking explicitly
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into account, in the valuation of a derivative, also the funding strategy that
needs to be put in place to manage the liquidity absorbed or generated by the
derivative, and we study the effect of a default on this strategy. We arrive at
an important finding: the consistent incorporation of funding costs and credit
risk implies that the crucial variable determining the cost of liquidity is not the
bond spread or the CDS spread, but the bond-CDS basis, or more generally the
difference between the funding spread of a bank and the spread measuring its
risk of default. This generates an asymmetric market where different parties
give different prices to the same derivative, but does not preclude the possibility
to reach an agreement, that may be struck at a price which generates day-one
profits for both counterparties. This reconciles the theory with the reality of the
market. Our analysis necessarily covers DVA, an ‘asset’ generated by the inclu-
sion of a bank’s own risk of default, the value of which increases the more the
bank approaches default. This characteristic appears to lead to a distortion of
financial choices and of financial communications (as they put it in Algorithmics
[1], “can you profit now from your own future default?”). The issue is: can DVA
be hedged and realized? In this work we show some steps towards a solution of
this DVA puzzle, because we display analytically how DVA can be evaluated as
a funding benefit. We show that even if a company does not take its own risk of
default explicitly into account, a full accounting of the funding benefit generates
an asset equal to DVA. If funding benefits can be realized before the default of
the company, then DVA becomes a realized financial benefit.
2 The setting
We consider a deal in which one entity, that we call B (borrower), commits to
pay a fixed amount K at time T to a party L (lender). This is a very simple
payoff that allows us to focus on liquidity and credit costs without unnecessary
complications. The simple payoff has several advantages. It is the derivative
equivalent of a zero-coupon bond issued by B or a loan from L to B, so that
we will be able to compare the results of our analysis with the well-established
market practice for such products. It is also a payoff where it is always clear who
is a net borrower and who is a net lender, thus we always have a premium when
the deal is struck, where we can incorporate a liquidity charge, similarly to the
real-world bank practice. The same would apply to stochastic option payoffs.
Instead, in case of bilateral stochastic payoffs like swaps, the deal is struck at
equilibrium but stochastic market movements will generate then a net lender
and a net borrower, analogously to the simple payoff analyzed here, so that the
extension to bilateral payoffs should be done in line with the results shown here.
We keep also the modelling assumptions simple. We assume that party X,
with X ∈ {B,L}, has a recovery rate RX and that the risk free interest rate that
applies to maturity T has a deterministic value r. As usual, r represents the
time-value of money on which the market agrees, excluding effects of liquidity or
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credit risk (it is an approximation for the OIS rate). A party X makes funding in
the market, that we call for simplicity the bond market. Party X is also reference
entity in the CDS market. We have therefore the following information:
1. the CDS spread piX . We take this spread to be deterministic and paid
instantaneously, and following the standard market model for credit risk
in the CDS market, called reduced-form or intensity model (see for example
[6]), the spread piX can be written
piX = λX LGDX (1)
where λX is the deterministic default intensity and LGDX = 1− RX is the
loss given default of entity X. If recovery is null, we have LGDX = 1 and the
CDS spread coincides with λX , so that Pr (τX > T ) = e−piX T . Therefore
piX must be intended as the best estimate of the risk-adjusted instanta-
neous default probability of X, taking expected recovery into account like
in (1). Notice that when the CDS market is illiquid or strongly affected
by the default risk of protection sellers, CDS spreads may not fully satisfy
this requirement. Clearly piX ≥ 0.
2. the cost of funding sX . For most issuers this is measured in the secondary
bond market and represents the best estimate of the spread over a risk-
free rate that a party pays on his funding. Normally banks maintain a
well defined funding curve, which is published internally by the treasury
department to provide guidance for the price of new funding or for other
purposes in connection with their liquidity policy. Notice however that
banks usually measure a spread over Libor, but since in these days the basis
between Libor and OIS in non-negligible, OIS rates are better estimate of
risk-free rates. Thus sX must be intended as a spread over OIS. We take
sX to be instantaneous and deterministic too, so that we can compute by
difference a liquidity basis γX with the same properties such that
sX = piX + γX
A proxy for the liquidity basis can be found in the bond-CDS basis, or more
precisely its opposite, since in the market jargon the CDS-bond basis is
defined as the difference between the CDS spread and a bond spread, thus
its sign is opposite to γX . The bond-CDS basis has generally been negative
and particularly high in absolute terms during the credit crunch. Positive
values of the bond-CDS basis are possible, but they are now mainly ob-
served for certain sovereign issuers, therefore we assume for now γX ≥ 0.
The name “liquidity basis” is justified by the fact that it is usually asso-
ciated with the cost of the liquidity provision that the buyer makes to the
issuer when buying the bond. This is dependent on the greater or lower
ease with which the bonds of X can be sold in the secondary market, thus
3
γX is related to both funding liquidity costs and market liquidity risk.
In particular, in the following we will shed more light on the role of the
liquidity spread in the valuation of funding costs and benefits.
Our aim is to describe the net present value VX (at time zero) of all cash-
flows generated by the transaction for the party, by consistently accounting for
liquidity and counterparty risk. We proceed as follows: we first consider the cur-
rent standard approach to DVA, then we attempt to introduce liquidity costs
by adjusting the discount rate, and show that this path would lead to double
accounting of the funding benefit associated with the DVA. Then we introduce
our approach that includes risky funding and discuss some interesting implica-
tions. We start with the assumption RX = 0, but in Section 5.3 we extend the
results to the case of positive recovery.
3 Standard DVA: Something is missing?
Let’s start from the market standard for CVA and DVA. Following for example
[3], the above deal has a premium paid by the lender L that equals the risk-free
price minus the CVA,
P = e−rT K − CVAL,
since the net present value of all cashflows for party L is
VL = e−rT K − CVAL − P, (2)
then
VL = 0 ⇒ P = e−rT K − CVAL
The CVA takes into account the probability that the borrower B defaults before
maturity
CVAL = E[e−rT K1{τB≤T}] = e
−rT K Q[τB ≤ T ]
= e−rTK
[
1− e−piBT ]
At the same time party B sees a value
VB = −e−rT K + DVAB + P (3)
VB = 0 ⇒ P = e−rT K − DVAB
with CVAL = DVAB.
This guarantees the symmetry VB = VL = 0 and the possibility for the
parties to agree on the premium of the deal,
P = e−rT e−piBTK. (4)
This approach does not consider explicitly the value of liquidity. In fact, in
exchange for the claim, at time 0 party B receives a cash flow from party L
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equal to P , so while party L has to finance the amount until the maturity of the
deal at its funding spread sL, party B can reduce its funding by P . So party B
should see a funding benefit, and party L should see the fair value of its claim
reduced by the financing costs. How come that these funding components do
not appear in the above valuation? Can we justify it by assuming that the two
companies have negligible funding costs? Not completely. In fact the absence
of the funding term for L can indeed be justified by assuming sL = 0. This
implies piL = 0. However the same assumption cannot be made for B without
changing completely the nature of the deal. In fact assuming sB = 0 would
imply piB = 0, which would cancel the DVA and CVA term. Thus when B is a
party with non-negligible risk of default he must have a funding cost given at
least by sB = piB > 0. The effect of this funding costs seems to be missing in
the above formula. In the next sections we analyze if it is really missing.
4 Standard DVA plus liquidity: Something is dupli-
cated?
We introduce liquidity costs by adjusting the discounting term, along the lines
of [8], but we also introduce defaultability of the payoff along the lines of [3],
getting for the lender
VL = E
[
e−(r+sL)TK1{τB>T}
]
− P (5)
= E
[
e−rT e−γLT e−piLTK1{τB>T}
]− P
= e−rT e−γLT e−piLTKe−piBT − P,
and analogously for the borrower
VB = −E
[
e−(r+sB)T K1{τB>T}
]
+ P (6)
= −E [e−rT e−piB T e−γB T K1{τB>T}]+ P
= −e−r T e−piB T e−γB TKe−piB T + P
= −e−r T e−2piB T e−γB TK + P
To compare this result, including CVA, DVA and liquidity from discounting,
with results on DVA obtained in the previous section 3, it is convenient to
reduce ourselves to the simplest situation where L is default free and with no
liquidity spread, while B is defaultable and has the minimum liquidity spread
allowed in this case: sL = 0, sB = piB > 0. We have
VL = e−rTKe−piBT − P
VB = −e−r T e−2piB TK + P
There are two bizarre aspects in this representation. First, even in a situation
where we have assumed no liquidity spread, two counterparties do not agree on
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the simplest transaction with default risk. A day-one profit should be accounted
by borrowers in all transactions with CVA. This belies years of market reality.
Secondly, the explicit inclusion of the DVA term results in the duplication of
the funding benefit for the party that assumes the liability. The formula implies
against all evidence that the funding benefit is remunerated twice. If this were
correct then a consistent accounting of liabilities at fair value would require
pricing zero-coupon bonds by multiplying twice their risk-free present value by
their survival probabilities. This also belies years of market reality.
5 Solving the puzzle
In order to solve the puzzle, we do not compute liquidity by the adjusted dis-
counting of (5) and (6), but generate liquidity costs and benefits by modelling
explicitly the funding strategy. The approach we take is that companies capital-
ize and discount money with the risk-free rate r, and then they add or subtract
the actual credit and funding costs that arise in the management of the deal.
This allows us to introduce explicitly in the picture both credit and liquidity,
which is an approach not pursued by [3] and [8], and to investigate more pre-
cisely where credit/liquidity gains and losses are financially generated. We now
take into account that the above deal has two legs. If we consider for example
the lender L, one leg is the “deal leg”, with net present value
E
[−P + e−rT Π]
where Π is the payoff at T , including a potential default indicator; the other leg
is the “funding leg” with net present value
E
[
+P − e−rT F ]
where F is the funding payback at T , including a potential default indicator.
When there is no default risk or liquidity cost involved, this funding leg can be
overlooked because it has a value
E
[
+P − e−rT erTP ] = 0.
Instead, in the general case the total net present value is
VL = E
[−P + e−rT Π + P − e−rT F ]
= E
[
e−rT Π− e−rT F ] .
Thus the premium at time 0 cancels out with its funding, and we are left with the
discounting of a total payoff including the deal’s payoff and the liquidity payback.
An analogous relationship applies to the borrower, as detailed in the next section.
In the following we work under the hypothesis that all liquidity management
happens in the cash market, so that funding is made by issuing bonds and
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excess funds are used to reduce or to avoid increasing the stock of bonds. This
is the most natural assumption since it is similar to the assumption that banks
make in their internal liquidity management, namely what the treasury desk
assumes in charging or rewarding trading desks.
5.1 Risky Funding with DVA for the borrower
The borrower B has a liquidity advantage from receiving the premium P at time
zero, as it allows him to reduce its funding requirement by an equivalent amount
P . The amount P of funding would have generated a negative cashflow at T ,
when funding must be paid back, equal to
− P erT esBT 1{τB>T} (7)
The outflow equals P capitalized at the cost of funding, times a default indicator
1{τB>T}. Why do we need to include a default indicator 1{τB>T}? Because in
case of default, under the assumption of zero recovery, the borrower does not pay
back the borrowed funding and there is no outflow. Thus reducing the funding
by P corresponds to receiving at T a positive amount equal to (7) in absolute
value,
P erT esBT 1{τB>T} (8)
= P erT epiBT eγBT 1{τB>T}
to be added to what B has to pay in the deal: −K 1{τB>T} .
Thus the total payoff at T is
1{τB>T}P e
rT epiBT eγBT − 1{τB>T}K (9)
Taking discounted expectation,
VB = e−piBT P epiBT eγBT −K e−piBT e−rT
= P eγBT −K e−piBT e−rT (10)
Compare with (6). Now we have no unrealistic double accounting of default
probability. Notice that
VB = 0 ⇒ PB = K e−piBT e−γBT e−rT (11)
where PB is the breakeven premium for the borrower, in the sense that the
borrower will find this deal convenient as long as
VB ≥ 0 ⇒ P ≥ PB.
Assume, as in (3), that γB = 0 so that in this case
PB = K e−piBT e−rT . (12)
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and compare with (4). We can conclude that in this case the standard compu-
tation from Section 3 is correct, as taking into account the probability of default
in the valuation of the funding benefit removes any liquidity advantage for the
borrower. Our formula shows what happens when there is also a ‘pure liquidity
basis’ component in the funding cost, γB > 0. On the other hand, charging
liquidity costs by an adjusted funding spread as in Section 4 cannot be natu-
rally extended to the case where we want to observe explicitly the possibility
of default events in our derivatives; for it to be consistent we need, as in [8],
to take the default events out of the picture. We will discuss this further in
sections 5.4 and 5.5. In writing the payoff for the borrower we have not explic-
itly considered the case in which the deal is interrupted by the default of the
lender, since, following standard derivative documentation such as [5], page 15,
the closeout amount at default of the lender should allow the borrower to replace
the transaction with an identical one with a new counterparty. This keeps VB
independent of the default time of the lender, consistently with the reality of
bond and deposit markets.
5.2 Risky funding with CVA for the lender, and the conditions
for market agreement
If the lender pays P at time 0, he incurs a liquidity cost. In fact he needs to
finance (borrow) P until T . At T , L will give back the borrowed money with
interest, but only if he has not defaulted. Otherwise he gives back nothing, so
the outflow is
P erT esLT 1{τL>T} (13)
= P erT eγLT epiLT 1{τL>T}
while he receives in the deal: K 1{τB>T} . The total payoff at T is therefore
− P erT eγLT epiLT 1{τL>T} +K 1{τB>T}. (14)
Taking discounted expectation
VL = −P eγLT e−piLT epiLT +K e−rT e−piBT
= −P eγLT +K e−rT e−piBT (15)
The condition that makes the deal convenient for the lender is
VL ≥ 0 ⇒ P ≤ PL, (16)
PL = K e−rT e−γLT e−piBT
where PL is the breakeven premium for the lender. It is interesting to note that
the lender, when he computes the value of the deal taking into account all future
cashflows as they are seen from the counterparties, does not include a charge to
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the borrower for that component piL of the cost of funding which is associated
with his own risk of default. This is canceled by the fact that funding is not given
back in case of default. In terms of relative valuation of a deal this fact about
the lender is exactly symmetric to the fact that for the borrower the inclusion
of the DVA eliminates the liquidity advantage associated with piB. In terms of
managing cashflows, instead, there is an important difference between borrower
and lender, which is discussed in Section 5.5. For reaching an agreement in the
market we need
VL ≥ 0, VB ≥ 0
which, recalling (11) and (16), implies
PL ≥ P ≥ PB (17)
K e−rT e−γLT e−piBT ≥ P ≥ Ke−rT e−piBT e−γBT
Thus an agreement can be found whenever
γB ≥ γL
This solves the puzzle, and shows that, if we only want to guarantee a positive
expected return from the deal, the liquidity cost that needs to be charged to the
counterparty of an uncollateralized derivative transaction is just the liquidity
basis, rather than the bond spread or the CDS spread. This is in line with
what happened during the liquidity crisis in 2007-2009, when the bond-CDS
basis exploded. The results of the last two sections go beyond [8] in showing
that only the bond-CDS basis is a proper liquidity spread, while the CDS spread
associated with the default intensity is a component of the funding cost offset by
the probability of defaulting in the funding strategy. In Section 5.5 we show how
the picture changes when we look at the possible realized cashflows (as opposed
to the expected cashflow), and we explore further the connections between this
work and [8].
5.3 Positive recovery extension
In this section we look at what happens if we relax the assumption of zero
recovery. The discounted payoff for the borrower is now
1{τB>T}e
−rT P epiBT eγBT erT
+1{τB≤T}e
−r τB RB e−r (T−τB) P epiBT eγBT erT
−1{τB>T}e−rT K
−1{τB≤T}e−r τB RB e−r (T−τB)K
where the recovery is a fraction RX of the present value of the claims at the time
of default of the borrower, consistently with standard derivative documentation.
Notice that B acts as a borrower both in the deal and in the funding leg, since
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we represented the latter as a reduction of the existing funding of B. Simplifying
the terms and taking the expectation at 0 we obtain
VB = Q {τB > T}P epiBT eγBT +Q {τB ≤ T} e−r T RB P epiBT eγBT erT
−Q {τB > T} e−rT K −Q {τB ≤ T}RB e−r T K
= P epiBT eγBT [SB(T ) + RB (1− SB(T ))]
−e−r T K [SB(T ) + RB (1− SB(T ))]
= [1− LGDB (1− SB(T ))]
(
P epiBT eγBT − e−r T K) (18)
where SB(T ) = Q {τB > T} is the survival probability of the borrower. Using
(1), we can write the first order approximation
1− e−piB T ≈ LGDB
(
1− e−λB T
)
which allows us to approximate (18) as
VB ≈ e−piBT
(
P epiBT eγBT − e−r T K)
= P eγBT − e−piBT e−r T K
We have thus shown that (10) is recovered as a first order approximation in the
general case of positive recovery rate. Similar arguments apply to the value of
the claim for L, that acts as a lender in the deal and as a borrower in the funding
leg. For L, (15) is recovered as a first order approximation of
VL = − [1− LGDL (1− SL(T ))] P epiLT eγLT
+ [1− LGDB (1− SB(T ))] e−r T K
In the following we show for simplicity a few more results under the assumption
RX = 0. The extension to the general case can be performed along the lines of
this section.
5.4 The accounting view for the borrower: DVA as a funding
benefit
One of the most controversial aspects of DVA relates to its consequences in the
accounting of liabilities in the balance sheet of a company. In fact the DVA
allows a borrower to condition future liabilities on survival, and this may create
a distorted perspective in which our default is our lucky day. However, liabilities
are already reduced by risk of default in the case of bonds when banks use the
fair value option according to international accounting standard, and even when
banks mark the bond liabilities at historical cost. What is the meaning of DVA?
Are we really taking into account a benefit that will be concretely observed just
in case of our default? In this section we show what happens if the borrower does
not condition its liabilities upon survival, namely he pretends to be default-free
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thereby ignoring DVA and avoiding a possibly distorted view where default is
a positive event. The borrower can perform valuation for accounting purposes
using an accounting credit spread piB that can be different from the market
spread and an accounting liquidity basis γB possibly different from the market
one, with the constraint that their sum sB must match the market funding
spread. In particular, when the party pretends to be default free, we have
piB = 0 and γB = sB, and there are no more indicators for our own default in
the payoffs.
Let a party B pretend, for accounting purposes, to be default free. The
premium P paid by the lender gives B a reduction of the funding payback at T
corresponding to a cashflow at T
PerT esBT ,
where there is no default indicator because B is treating itself as default-free.
This cashflow must be compared with the payout of the deal at T , which is
−K
again without indicator, ie without DVA. Thus the total payoff at T is
erT esBT −K (19)
By discounting to zero we obtain an accounting value VB such that
VB = P esBT −K e−rT
which yields an accounting breakeven premium PB for the borrower equal to the
breakeven of (11),
PB = K e−rT e−piBT e−γBT , (20)
where now piB and γB are those provided in the market. So also in this case the
borrower B recognizes on its liability a funding benefit that actually takes into
account its own market risk of default piB, plus additional liquidity basis γB,
thereby matching the premium computed by the lender that includes the CVA/
DVA term. But now this term is accounted for as a funding benefit and not
as a benefit coming from the reduction of future expected liabilities thanks to
default. The results of these sections give an indication on how the DVA term
can be realized. When a bank enters a deal in a borrower position, it is making
funding for an amount as large as the premium. If this premium is used to reduce
existing funding which is equally or more expensive, that in our setting means
buying bonds or avoiding some issuance that would be necessary otherwise, this
provides a tangible financial benefit that is enjoyed in survival by a reduction
of the payments at maturity.1 The reduction is given by the difference in (19).
1With reference to some considerations in [4], we point out that a bank can buy back its
own bonds. In fact, this is actually ‘selling protection on yourself’, but it is fully funded. When
a sale of protection is funded, there is no counterparty risk and therefore no limit to whom can
sell protection, differently from the case of an unfunded CDS. In fact buying their own bonds
is a standard and important activity of banks.
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For most banks the quantity of outstanding bonds is sufficiently high to allow
the implementation of such a strategy, although it involves difficulties that vary
from bank to bank. In any case we have shown how the DVA term can be seen
not as a ‘default benefit’ moral hazard, but rather a natural component of fair
value whenever fair value mark-to-market takes into account counterparty risk
and funding costs.
5.5 The accounting view for the lender: expected value vs carry
The above results show that the borrower’s valuation does not change if he
considers himself default free by using an accounting credit spread piB = 0 and
treating all the funding cost sB he sees in the market as a pure liquidity spread
γB = sB. Do we have a similar property also for the lender? Not at all. If the
lender computes the breakeven premium using an accounting credit spread piL
and an accounting liquidity spread γL = sL−piL different from those provided by
the market, he gets a different breakeven premium, because, following Section
5.2,
PL = K e−rT e−γLT e−piBT
thus the breakeven premium and the agreement that will be reached in the
market depend crucially on γL. In Figure 1, for a sample deal, we show how
PL varies when, holding sL fixed, we vary κL = γLsL , that we call the liquidity
ratio of the lender. This is not the only difference between the situation of the
borrower and the lender. Notice that the borrower’s net payout at maturity T
is given in (9) and is non-negative in all states of the world if we keep P ≥ PB,
although the latter condition was designed only to guarantee that the expected
payout is non-negative. For the lender instead the payout at maturity is given
by (14). The condition (16) for the non-negativity of the expected payout of
the lender does not imply the non-negativity of (14), in particular we can have
a negative carry even if we assume that both counterparties will survive until
maturity. If we want to guarantee a non-negative carry at least when nobody
defaults, in addition to (16) we need the following condition to be satisfied
piL ≤ piB. (21)
Otherwise the lender, differently from the borrower, is exposed to liquidity short-
age and negative carry even if the deal is, on average, convenient to him. Liq-
uidity shortages when no one defaults can be excluded by imposing for each deal
(21), or, with a solution working for whatever deal with whatever counterparty,
by working as if the lender was default-free. Only if the lender pretends for
accounting purposes to be default-free the condition for the convenience of the
deal based on expected cashflows becomes
P ≤ K e−rT e−sLT e−piBT = K e−rT e−γLT e−piLT e−piBT
12
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Figure 1: Breakeven premium for the Lender PL as a function of the
liquidity cost ratios κL and κB when sL = 0.05, sB = 0.1, T = 20,
K = 100, r = 0.02; xy plane crosses the z axis at the breakeven
premium for the Borrower PB . A deal is possible only in the blue
region.
that clearly implies the non-negativity of (14). On the other hand, the lender’s
assumption to be default-free makes a market agreement more difficult, since
K e−rT e−γBT e−piBT ≤ P ≤ K e−rT e−γLT e−piLT e−piBT
implies
γB ≥ γL + piL
rather than γB ≥ γL. We finally notice that this assumption leads to results
equivalent to [8]. In fact, under this assumption, uncollateralized payoffs should
be discounted at the full funding also in our simple setting. Let’s consider a
bank X that pretends to be default-free and thus works under κB = κX = 1
when the bank X is a net borrower and κL = κX = 1 when X is in a lender
position. When the bank is in the borrower position we have
PB = PX = e−sXT e−rTK
while when it is in a lender position with respect to a counterparty (with no risk
of default as in the example of [8]) the breakeven premium will be given by
PL = e−sXT e−rTK = PB = PX .
and the discounting at the funding rate r+sX is recovered for both positive and
negative exposures.
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6 Conclusions
In this article we have laid the groundwork of a consistent framework for the
joint pricing of liquidity costs and counterparty risk. By explicitly modelling
the funding components of a simplified derivative where both counterparties can
default, we have shown how bilateral counterparty risk adjustments (CVA and
DVA) can be combined with liquidity/funding costs without unrealistic double
counting effects. We have shown that DVA has a meaningful representation in
terms of funding benefit for the borrower, so that a bank can take into account
DVA and find an agreement with lenders computing CVA even when it neglects
its own probability of default. On the other hand, the lender’s cost of funding
includes a component that is associated with his own risk of default, but this
component cancels out with his default probability, so that only his liquidity
spread (or equivalently his bond-CDS basis) contributes as a net funding cost
to the value of a transaction. We have shown that the comparison between the
liquidity spread of lender and borrower is crucial to assess if a trade is convenient
for both counterparties. In the end we have also discussed how the situation of
the borrower and that of the lender are different, in particular the lender can
have negative carry upon no default even if the value of the deal is positive to
him. Thus, while the debate appears to be focussed on the impact of accounting
choices on the valuation of liabilities, according to our results it is rather on
the valuation of assets that such choices make a difference. The extension of
these results to more general derivative payoffs, where a counterparty can shift
between a net borrower position and a net lender position depending on market
movements, is a crucial topic for future research.
References
[1] Algorithmics (2009). Credit Value Adjustment and the chang-
ing environment for pricing and managing counterparty risk.
http://www.algorithmics.com/EN/media/pdfs/Algo-WP1209-
CVASurvey.pdf
[2] Barden P. (2009) Equity forward prices in the presence of funding spreads.
ICBI Conference, Rome.
[3] Brigo D. and Capponi A. (2009). Bilateral Counterparty Risk Valuation
with Stochastic Dynamical Models and Application to Credit Default Swaps.
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1318024.
[4] Fries, C. (2010). Discounting Revisited: Valuation Un-
der Funding, Counterparty Risk and Collateralization.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1609587.
14
[5] International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
Inc. (2009) ISDA Close-out Amount Protocol.
http://www.isda.org/isdacloseoutamtprot/isdacloseoutamtprot.html
[6] Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). Pricing Derivatives on Financial Securities Sub-
ject to Credit Risk. Journal of Finance, Vol 50 (1995), 53-85.
[7] Morini M. (2009). Solving the puzzle in the interest rate market (Part 1 &
2). SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1506046
[8] Piterbarg V. (2010). Funding beyond discounting: collateral agreements and
derivatives pricing. Risk February
15
